Chapter 1, Lecture 1, J

Nevertheless, the created intellect is able to contemplate his essence according to some mode which shall be attained, but not through any abject of species or any creaturly similitude, because none of them is able to lead [?] into the divine essence much less than the body is able to lead into incorporeal essence. Thus therefore, according to the reasoning of Dionysius it is fitting to say that God is both incomprehensible to all intellects and incontemplatible to us in his essence, in that our intellect has been bound to created things, namely to things which are of similar nature to us; and thus it is in the state of life. And because he had called God unity, lest anyone believe it is that unity inhering in things formally, just as in things themselves by participation, in order that this be excluded he adds “unity” namely subsisting in itself, “unifying all unity” that is pouring out unity into all things which participate in unity according to any mode. Then because God had been called supersubstantial unity and good beyond the mind, someone is able to believe that God is in no way able to be called a substance or mind or anything of this kind, therefore, to exclude this error, he adds that God is indeed “a substance” but “supersubstantial.” Concerning this odd language we ought to reflect that names, when they have been imposed by us, they signify according to how things stand in our cognition. Therefore that itself which God is is beyond our cognotion, as has been made clear, our cognition however is commensurable to created things, the names we have imposed thus do not signify according to a congruence to the divine excellence, but according to a coming together to the essence of created things. The “to be” of created things however, has drawn out from the divine “to be” according to a certain sort of incomplete assimilation. Thus therefore, because of this, whatever similitude there is of created things to God, the names which we use are able to be said to be names of God—not as they would be of creatures, but through a certain projection—and Dionysius signifies this when he says that God is “a supersubstantial substance” (supersubstantialis substantia), and he puts it similarly that God is “a non intelligible intellect” (intellectus non-intelligibilis), that is not the sort of intellect which is intelligible [I’m not sure what the technical translation of this word is, it means able to be held in our intellect MNP] “and” he is “an unspeakable word” (verbum non-dicibile), that is not the sort of word which is able to be spoken by us.