Chapter 1, Lecture 1, K

However, just as the names which we impose are able to be said of God following the fact that there is some similitude of creatures to God; likewise following the fact that creatures fall short from a full image of God, the names we impose are able to be removed from God, and their opposite to be predicated (of Him). Whence he adds that God thus is called “reason” which is also able to be called “irrationality” (irrationabilitas), and thus he is called an intellect that is able to be called “non-intellectuality” (non-intelligibilitas); and thus he is called a word that is able to be called “non-namedness” (innominabilitas); not indeed because of this that these things do not extend to Him, but because “like (?) (secundum) none of the existing things is (his) existence”, that is he does not exist according to (secundum) the manner of any existing thing; “and” He Himself, “indeed” is “the cause” of existing “for all”, pouring forth into all whatsoever (?) their similitude; and thus he is able to be named from the names of creatures; “He Himself however is non-existing” not as if lacking an essence, but “as it were” existing “above all substances”; and he is “non-namedness” (innominabilitas) “thus he utters Himself from Himself, Personally and Knowingly” that is according to the property of his own “to be” and according to His own perfect Knowledge of Himself, by which mode, no one is able to utter Him. After these things have been said, he reaches the first conclusion when he adds: “from this therefore, just as it has been said, one ought not dare to speak nor to know anything about the supersubstantial and hidden deity, save those things which have been Divinely expressed to us from the Holy Speech” which has been explained above.