Chapter 1, Lecture 1, I

In this he touched upon four things, namely: substances, which are the object of cognition; mind, that is simple intellect; deliberation, that is investigative reason and which pertains to cognitive virtues; and the word which pertains to the manifestation of cognition. He gives however these four because he does not only intend to show that God is not able to be comprehended through any cognitive virtue, or to be manifested perfectly in speech, but neither is he [comprehended or manifested] through any created object or through any creaturely similitude. Thus also in the examples which he gives, he does not say that intelligible things are incomprehensible to the senses, but to sensible things because intelligible things are not able to be comprehended through sensible. And likewise for the other examples. And it should be noted that he does not only say that intelligible things are incomprehensible through sensible things, but also uncontemplible because through things which are of an inferior order, not only are superior things not able to be comprehended, but neither are they contemplated. This is because we contemplate through something when through one thing we are able to see the essence of that we may know from what it is. The essence of something is comprehended however when it is held in cognition [cogniscit] perfectly, as it is knowable [cogniscibilis]. For who knows the demonstrated conclusion to a medial degree, even if he somehow contemplates it, nevertheless, he does not comprehend it because he does not reach up to the perfect mode of his cognition. Thus, therefore, God is indeed incomprehensible to all created intellects because he is beyond all mind and reason, inasmuch as having more from the brightness of truth in his essence (and this pertains to knowability), than any creature from his power of knowing. Thus no creature is able to attain to the perfect mode of his own knowledge, which is called “supersubstantial knowledge” which would be to comprehend him.

Chapter 1, Lecture 1, H

And because of this he adds “just as incomprehensible.” For indeed the Divine Essence is touched by the mind of the blessed, but is not comprehended. And indeed God does this “through justice.” For the ratio of distributive justice consists in this, that each one receives according to his condition. And as through the arrangement of distributive justice established by the magistrate, the whole political order is made whole, so through this order of justice the whole order of the universe is made whole by God, for if this is subtracted, all remains in confusion. And indeed he says this “it befits God”; for it befits him on account of his goodness to save those he has made. He gives a second reason where he says “sicut enim incomprehensibilia etc.” (“for thus incomprehensible things etc.”), namely: a superior rank of being is not able to be comprehended by the inferior, just as intelligible things are not able to be comprehended perfectly through the senses, nor simple things through composite, nor incorporeal through corporeal; but God is beyond every order of created things; therefore he is not able to be comprehended through anything created. And he says this when he says: “for thus the intelligible are incomprehensible and incontemplatible by” (that is through) “the senses; and the simple and unshaped” (through things) “which are in composition and figure (figura)” that is which are composite and shaped (figurata) (for there is no figure unless of composite things); and thus “deficiency” of things “incorporeal,” that is things lacking form of a body, which deficiency or privation indeed is intangible and infigurable, that is the deficiency is incorporeity itself; such things lack form and are intangible and infigurable (to understand we place an abstraction for the concrete), “such things are incomprehensible and inconteplatible in their forms according to the figure of bodies” that is by bodies themselves thus, I say, that is, “according to the same reason of truth, oneness is placed above” that is God who is oneness that is existing as one through his own essence “which is supersubstantial, and is placed above substances and which is beyond the mind” placed above “minds” that is beyond intellectual spirits; and “good Himself” namely God, “which is beyond comprehension” that is beyond all reason, “is incomprehensible to all comprehensions” that is no creaturely reason can investigate it “and which is beyond the word” that is beyond all locution of a creature, “is ineffable” that is unspeakable “in any created word.”

Chapter 1, Lecture 1, G

“And” thus, now we do not extend ourselves more to understanding divine things, than the light of sacred Scripture extends itself, “snub-nosed” through this “constriction”, as if confined to a certain limit “about divine things” by a kind of “temperance and sanctity”: by sanctity when we maintain the splendid truth of sacred Scripture from all error; by temperance when we thrust ourselves to things no greater than we have been given. Then, when he says “etenim” “for indeed” etc. he shows clearly what the reason for this conclusion are: and first, that God is known to Himself alone, too us however he is hidden; second, he shows clearly the way by which the divine cognition is communicated to us; where: “non tamen incommunicabile est” “it is not however incommunicable” etc. Regarding the first, he shows twice; the first of these, from reasons, second from authorities; where “etenim sicut ipsa de seipsa” “for indeed just as himself from he himself…” He puts however, at the first, two reasons; of which the first thus: divine things are revealed by God according to the proportion of the things to whom they are revealed; but to know the infinite is beyond the proportion of the finite intellect; therefore the thing itself which God is beyond the proportion of the finite intellect; therefore the thing itself which God is not known by anyone through divine revelation. And this is what he says: certain “divine things are revealed” by God “and contemplated” by us, “according to the proportion of the minds of each.” [It would seem mentuim “of minds” should be singular, but it is plural here, and in Dionysius…] And I have amended what he earlier said [because it was too difficult] to: “If it is fitting in any respect to believe the all wise and most true theology”, that is sacred Scripture [divine things are revealed according to the minds of each]. Fir it says in Matthew 25 “he gave …to every man according to his several ability.” (AV) And it should be noted that he lays down two reasons from which it is shown that sacred Scripture ought to be believed in the highest degree. [It doesn’t match!!!!] For it happens to something that it is not to be believed from two reasons: either because it is, or at least is reputed to be, ignorant, or because it is, or at least is reputed to be, malicious. Thence, as sacred Scripture is all-wise, and most true because it has been revealed by and related by God who is truth and knows all, sacred Scripture ought to be believed in the highest degree. And this I say “thearchic” that is divine “goodness” having been separated “from the measured things” that is, from finite things, by “immesurability” that is by the infinitude of the divine essence, but not with the result that we are not acquainted with it in any way, but that it is not comprehended.

Chapter 1, Lecture 1, F

“And” thus, now we do not extend ourselves more to understanding divine things, than the light of sacred Scripture extends itself, “snub-nosed” through this “constriction”, as if confined to a certain limit “about divine things” by a kind of “temperance and sanctity”: by sanctity when we maintain the splendid truth of sacred Scripture from all error; by temperance when we thrust ourselves to things no greater than we have been given. Then, when he says “etenim” “for indeed” etc. he shows clearly what the reasons for this conclusion are: and first, that God is known to Himself alone, too us however he is hidden; second, he shows clearly the way by which the divine cognition is communicated to us; where: “non tamen incommunicabile est” “it is not however incommunicable” etc. Regarding the first, he shows twice; the first of these, from reasons, second from authorities; where “etenim sicut ipsa de seipsa” “for indeed just as himself from he himself…”