Chapter 1, Lecture 1, I

In this he touched upon four things, namely: substances, which are the object of cognition; mind, that is simple intellect; deliberation, that is investigative reason and which pertains to cognitive virtues; and the word which pertains to the manifestation of cognition. He gives however these four because he does not only intend to show that God is not able to be comprehended through any cognitive virtue, or to be manifested perfectly in speech, but neither is he [comprehended or manifested] through any created object or through any creaturely similitude. Thus also in the examples which he gives, he does not say that intelligible things are incomprehensible to the senses, but to sensible things because intelligible things are not able to be comprehended through sensible. And likewise for the other examples. And it should be noted that he does not only say that intelligible things are incomprehensible through sensible things, but also uncontemplible because through things which are of an inferior order, not only are superior things not able to be comprehended, but neither are they contemplated. This is because we contemplate through something when through one thing we are able to see the essence of that we may know from what it is. The essence of something is comprehended however when it is held in cognition [cogniscit] perfectly, as it is knowable [cogniscibilis]. For who knows the demonstrated conclusion to a medial degree, even if he somehow contemplates it, nevertheless, he does not comprehend it because he does not reach up to the perfect mode of his cognition. Thus, therefore, God is indeed incomprehensible to all created intellects because he is beyond all mind and reason, inasmuch as having more from the brightness of truth in his essence (and this pertains to knowability), than any creature from his power of knowing. Thus no creature is able to attain to the perfect mode of his own knowledge, which is called “supersubstantial knowledge” which would be to comprehend him.